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The Relationship Between
Small Business Loans
and Wages
Alexander Foxx
Introduction

N

inety eight percent of small businesses do not utilize equity
funding (Bates 1990), making debt a pivotal source of
capital. Examining the underdevelopment and poverty of
many urban areas, it is reasonable to question if an increase of
available capital benefits these areas. While loans may be necessary
to build wealth, they may not always be beneficial. Loans could
benefit areas by increasing capital to fuel growth or, conversely, serve
as an unnecessary debt burden. Using data on loans from the
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), this paper examines if the
number of small business loans in a county affects the wages of its
residents.
The Community Reinvestment Act enacted by "Congress in 1977
. . . is intended to encourage depository institutions to help meet the
credit needs of the communities in which they operate." 1 Banks are
subsequently rated according to how well they serve their community
and given a rating of Outstanding, Satisfactory, Needs to Improve, or
Substantial Non-Compliance. The rules for these rankings are not
standardized and may vary across banks, regulators, communities,
and situations (Garrison and Lawrence 1995). However, the rankings
are made public and are considered in bank requests of government
approval (e.g., a merger or acquisition) and subsequently serve as an
incentive for banks to seek a high rating. One way a bank can
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increase this rating is by lending to small businesses, the thought
being that as small businesses of a community are given access to
capital, the businesses will grow and benefit the surrounding
community. Indeed, small businesses receive a large portion, 18.75
percent, of their capital from banks (Berger and Udell 1995).
Do small business loans actually benefit a community? An
inverse relationship between small business loans and the income of
an area would suggest that small business loans are not benefitting
communities. Conversely, a positive relationship may be cause to
incentivize more small business loans. Not only do policy makers and
small business owners have a stake in this question, in the form of
improving their communities, but banks as well. As communities
develop, default rates may decline and loans will be more profitable.
To estimate the relationship between small business loans and the
growth of a community, I collected data from the IRS, CRA, and
Census. The annual wages in a county are regressed against the
number of loans originated in that year, controlling for poverty and
population. This model demonstrates the effects of small business
loans in counties, accounting for the size of the loan as well as the
current economic development of the county, accounted for by
poverty rate. I find that small business loans' ability to increase
county wages varies depending on the type of county, with small
counties demonstrating a positive effect and large counties a negative
effect.
Literature Review
The efficacy of the Community Reinvestment Act is not agreed
upon (Hylton and Rougeau 1997). The importance of small business
loans to small businesses and the community can be seen in the
dependency small businesses have on debt capital and relationship
lending. Berger and Udell (2002) examine bank lending to small
institutions, specifically how relationship based lending (versus a
more metric based approach) functions between the banking industry
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and small businesses. They, along with others (Chittendon 1996;
Bates 1990), emphasize the importance commercial bank lending
plays in the role of small business financing--it accounts for, on
average, 18.75 percent of small business financing. Given this
importance, Berger and Udell seek to explore the methods by which
banks evaluate small business credit worthiness.
Berger and Udell create four evaluation methods, one of which is
relationship-based lending. Their paper explores changes that can
restrict or make more available financing under the basis of
relationship-based lending. Their paper concludes that as the banking
industry consolidates, relationship based lending will become more
scarce and financing to small businesses more difficult, as banks will
become much more institutionalized with more degrees of separation
from the small businesses. Given this relationship-based approach
between small businesses and banks, it is worth examining if small
business lending is actually beneficial.
In addition to the necessity of loans to small businesses, lending
may not be profitable in many areas. Economist Michael Porter posits
the difficulty of effective lending in urban areas (Porter 1995). In
regards to small business loans, Porter claims that lack of debt
financing is a pervasive problem in the inner city, as these loans are
only "marginally profitable." However, Porter notes that the
Community Reinvestment Act has heightened lending competition in
the inner city and, in some cases such as Boston, it is profitable. To
take a broader view of this article, Porter maintains that inner city
areas can be revitalized but only through catering to the strengths of
the inner city which can be applied outside of the inner city, not by
catering to strengths that exist outside of the inner city and attempting
to internalize them. In order for this goal of an "exporting" the inner
city to be realized, Porter claims that capital need be made available
to urban, inner city areas. This will aid in creating an inner city that
can serve its populace and the other populaces profitably.
Given Porter's claim that debt financing would improve the inner
city, my topic seems an apt one. Will providing financing in an area
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improve the wages of the residents? If so, it seems Porter's claim is
founded. If not, perhaps another source of capital and stimulus need
be considered for urban funding, such as equity or subsidies (to
Porter's chagrin, he maintains that government subsidies often
introduce businesses to an inner city area that cannot viably operate in
the long-run). 2 While Porter notes that the CRA might find difficulty
in revitalizing communities and others note the poor implementation
of the associated bank ranking system (Garrison 1995), viewpoints
exist that support its continuance (Hylton and Rougeau 1997). This
paper estimates the effect the CRA has on communities in the form of
small business loans in order to provide a view of the Act.
Theoretical Model
The primary economic
theory underpinning my
empirical analysis is the
Theory of a Multiplier
Effect. This effect describes
how an initial influx of
money creates more value
than its original injection
due to a multiplicative
circulation. The Multiplier
Effect
suggests
that
spending and investment
Figure 1
will beget more spending
Theoretical Model
and investment.
In the
context of small business loans, a single small business loan will
multiply to an investment in the community larger than the size of the
original loan. This growth is illustrated in the labor market. An initial
loan will increase the size of a small business, which will
subsequently need to hire more workers, increasing the demand for
laborers from D to D' (Figure 1).
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This initial stimulus raises the wages of workers, allowing for
additional spending in the community. In turn, there arises a need for
more workers to produce the newly demanded goods and services in
the community. This shift in labor demand even further from D' to D''
raises wages from their initial position at W to a final position at W''
(Figure 2). This growth in wages and the quantity of labor is beyond
the initial business loan.
The magnitude of the multiplier effect is determined by the
marginal propensity to consume, or how much of every additional
dollar earned a wage-earner will spend. The Multiplier Effect can also
illustrate decreases, as some of my data illustrates. A negative
multiplier would demonstrate that a stimulus is harming the labor
market by causing labor demand to shift left. This would imply there
is something inherently harmful in the stimulus.

Figure 2
Theoretical Model

Data
To examine the effect of loans on wages, I collect data from
various sources. The CRA website reports small business loan
originations and I used information from the years 2006-2012. For the
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same years, I collect wages from the IRS and county poverty and
population from the US Census Bureau. Summary statistics for these
variables are reported in Table 1.
Summary Statistics
The summary statistics pertain to 88 Ohio counties over seven
years for a total of 616 observations. Total number of loans is the
total number of business loans in a given county year, combining the
number of small, medium, and large small business loans. This serves
as the primary regressor. Wages are measured as total county wages,
as reported on form 1040 by the individuals of a county, for a county
and year. The poverty rate measures the number of all individuals in a
county year in poverty over the number of total individuals in that
county year. It should be noted that in the loan categories, as well as
in total wages and population, the three largest Ohio cities' counties
(Hamilton-Cincinnati, Franklin-Columbus, Cuyahoga-Cleveland)
consistently demonstrate the maximum values over all seven years.

Variable
Total Number of Loans
Number of Small SB Loans
Number of Medium SB Loans
Number of Large SB Loans
Wages (Thousands of $s)
Poverty Rate
Population
n=616

Mean

Std. Dev.

Max

Maximum

2515.6
2332.3
88.5
94.8
2217429.0
14.2
131015.8

5175.4
4857.9
166.3
194.4
3918968.0
4.7
212082.6

33.0
30.0
0.0
0.0
131431.0
4.2
13219.0

48020.0
46225.0
1088.0
1239.0
24700000.0
35.0
1305273.0

Table 1
Summary Statistics
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Empirical Model and Results
Using the data from the following section I construct a model to
estimate total county wages in a year. My model estimates total
wages in a county and year using the following regression
specification:
yit=β0+β1 (Number of Loansit)+ β2 (Poverty Rateit)+ β3
(Populationit)+ δt + τi + Uit
The variable yit is the total wages in a county for a given year; β1
estimates how an additional loan in county i and year t affects the
total wages in that county and year, in thousands. The coefficient β2
estimates the change in thousands of dollars of county wages that a
1percent increase in poverty rate has on county i in time period t; β3
estimates the effect of increasing population by one will have on
thousands of dollars of total wages in a county year; δt and τi account
for origination year and county fixed effects respectively. The
baseline regression yields the results in Table 4.
DV: Wages in County-Year

All Counties

Number of Loans
Poverty Percentage
Population
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-57.2***
(17.9)
-1,789
(5,889)
11.2
(8.62)
-10,514
(275,791)
616
0.997

Table 4
Regression of all county years
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The coefficient in Table 4 indicates that additional small business
loans decrease total wages of a county by $57,200 on average,
holding poverty rate and population constant. The coefficient on loans
is significant at the one percent level. This produces an unexpected
result with a theoretical model that typically predicts growth.
To explore this result further, I divide counties into two sections
based on loan volume. Table 5 illustrates differences in "small" and
"large" counties. I define small counties as counties with less than an
average of 600 loans over the seven year period while big counties
have greater than or equal to an average of 600 loans.
DV:Total Wages in County-Year
Number of Loans
Poverty Rate
Population
Constant

Observations
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

with loans<600

with loans=>600

54.2***
(12.7)
-567
(666)
-5.23
(3.91)
417,953***
(111,078)

-58.6***
(18.3)
-2,375
(8,966)
11.3
(8.36)
9660000.00
(10700000)

175
0.996

441
0.997

Table 5
Regression with divided counties specified

This stratification illustrates that small business loans appear to be
associated with decreasing wages in large counties and increasing
wages in small counties. On average, an increase of one small
business loan in a small county leads to wages increasing by $54,200.
In large counties, however, an additional loan creates a decline of
$58,600. Both results are significant at the one percent level.
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This result is also consistent across the dollar amount of the loans,
which is calculated by substituting the total dollar amount of loans for
the number of loans in the regression model. This yields the results of
Table 6. Across all counties the model estimates a dollar loaned
decreases total wages by $1.30. This result holds for large counties,
but small counties have an estimated $1.54 gain for every dollar
loaned to small businesses. This supports the claim that small
business loans may have a positive effect in small counties and
negative effect in large counties due to the negative coefficient for
large counties and positive for small counties. This illustrates a
multiplier effect that is negative in large counties and positive in
small counties.
DV: Total Wages
Amount of Dollars Loaned
Poverty Rate
Population
Constant

Observations
R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

All Counties

with loans<600

with loans>=600

-1.30***
(0.37)
2,155
(9,273)
11.5***
(2.29)
-154,170
(227,316)

1.54***
(0.52)
-754
(676)
-5.25
(4.10)
434,765***
(115,487)

-1.31
(1.62)
810
(9,695)
11.6
(11.2)
8.85e+06
(1.39e+07)

616
0.996

175
0.996

441
0.996

Table 6
Dollar Amount Results

The criticism of the effect of the data capturing county wages
before the small business loans were made might also arise. Reverse
causality might arise if a large number of loans are originated at the
end of a year and the effects not seen until the following recording
period for wages. To account for this the total loan number of each
county was lagged one year. The results are reported in Table 7.
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These results illustrate consistent results with loans in the same
year; small business loans in big counties have an estimated negative
effect and small counties a positive effect. These results also support
the claim that small business loans originated in large counties harm
wages, while small business loans originated in small counties raise
wages.
DV: Total County Wages

All Counties

with loans<600

with loans>=600

Lagged Number of Loans

-79.3***
(12.5)
-4,395
(5,140)
10.8
(6.72)
91,296
(220,912)

32.3**
(13.9)
-94.2
(655)
-9.99**
(4.22)
581,008***
(119,982)

-80.6***
(12.9)
-5,260
(7,619)
10.9*
(6.49)
11400000
(8260000)

150
0.996

378
0.998

Poverty Rate
Population
Constant

Observations
528
R-squared
0.998
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7
Lagged Results

Conclusion
The mechanism by which the effect of small business loans hurt
or harm wages, depending on the county size in which the loan is
originated, remains unclear. This may occur because small counties
promote a more intimate lending environment where loans are not
originated to small business that might perform poorly. By contrast,
large counties may contain an environment of anonymity that allows
small business loans to be obtained even by businesses that will not
prosper. Small counties may have a better grasp on how successful
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loan recipients will be because they are more familiar with the habits
of the loan recipient. If this is the case, it would illustrate the
importance of relationship-based lending over an automated metricbased approach because the relationship based lending of small
counties would be proved superior to the anonymity of larger
counties. The results illustrate an inherent difference in small and
large counties; what this difference is may be the subject that can
guide further policy or revision of current policy.
The importance of determining the efficacy of small business is
important as it not only will serve to guide policy, but may determine
what kind of capital is available to small businesses. If small
businesses cannot aid the community through debt financing, it might
be wise to consider policy that would raise their ability to gain equity
financing. The result of the empirical model, estimating a detrimental
effect of small business loan originations in large counties and a
positive effect in small counties, may prompt a rethinking of policy
toward credit accessibility. Perhaps policy advocating increases in
small business loans should be redirected to small counties and
eliminated from large ones, which would require a revision of current
Community Reinvestment Act and other similar policies to account
for the differences between counties.
Notes
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